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The legal pendulum swings back
Mark Pawlowski outlines a recent Court of Appeal ruling on
the meaning of dishonesty where there is accessory liability
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor 
of property law at the
University of Greenwich
DISHONEST ASSISTANCE 
O
ver the last decade, judicial con-
troversy has surrounded the
meaning of dishonesty in the con-
text of the liability of a third party who
has assisted in a breach of trust. In Royal
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] Lord
Nicholls used the word in an objective
sense as meaning not acting as an honest
person would in the circumstances. An
element of subjectivity was, however,
inevitable in this formulation since hon-
esty could only be assessed properly in
the light of what a person actually knew
at the relevant time, as distinct from what
a reasonable person would have known
or appreciated. Crucially, however, this
did not mean that an individual would be
free to set up their own standard of hon-
esty in order to avoid the consequences of
their actions. According to his Lordship:
… honesty is not an optional scale, with
higher or lower values according to the
moral standards of each individual. 
On this reasoning, therefore, an individ-
ual would be characterised as dishonest
notwithstanding that they did not realise
that what they were doing was dishonest
by ordinary standards of honest people.
Ruling in Twinsectra
Unfortunately, the majority of the House
of Lords in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002]
reached a different conclusion. According
to Lord Hoffmann, accessory liability
required a dishonest state of mind – in
other words, a consciousness on the part
of the defendant that they were trans-
gressing ordinary standards of honest
behaviour. On this formulation, there-
fore, a person would not be acting
dishonestly if they knew of the facts that
created the trust and its breach, but had
not been aware that what they were
doing would be regarded by honest
people as being dishonest. Lord Hutton
made the point even more clearly: 
… for liability as an accessory to arise the
defendant must himself appreciate that
what he was doing was dishonest by the
standards of honest and reasonable men.
The ‘combined test’ of the majority
rejects, therefore, a purely subjective
standard (whereby a person is only
regarded as dishonest if they transgress
their own standard of honesty) and 
also discards the purely objective stan-
dard (whereby a person is dishonest
only if their conduct is dishonest by the
ordinary standards of honest people).
According to Lord Millett, however,
who gave a strong dissenting judgment,
civil liability did not normally require a
guilty mind. In the civil context, liability
was usually dependent on the defen-
dant’s course of conduct rather than
their state of mind. Accordingly, in his
view, dishonesty did not require the
defendant to be aware that they were
acting contrary to objective standards of
behaviour. In the words of Lord Millett:
In my opinion, Lord Nicholls was adopting
an objective standard of dishonesty by
which the defendant is expected to attain
the standard which would be observed 
by an honest person placed in similar 
circumstances. Account must be taken 
of subjective considerations such as the
defendant’s experience and intelligence
and his actual state of knowledge at the
relevant time. But it is not necessary that
he should actually have appreciated that
he was acting dishonestly; it is sufficient
that he was. 
On this approach, therefore, like in
Tan, the only subjective elements are those
relating to the defendant’s knowledge,
experience and attributes. Significantly,
the objective elements concern both the
standard of honesty and the recognition
of wrongdoing. This rejection of subjec-
tive dishonesty also led his Lordship 
‘The two-stage test
endorsed by the Privy
Council has been
welcomed by academics
and practitioners as
avoiding the absurdity of
a defendant successfully
escaping liability by simply
arguing that they believed
that their conduct was
objectively honest.’
T&ELTJ83 p20-22 Pawlowski  18/1/07  17:48  Page 20
January/February 2007 Trusts and Estates Law & Tax Journal 21
DISHONEST ASSISTANCE  
to conclude that knowledge was the 
determining ingredient for accessory lia-
bility and that there should be a return to
the traditional description of this head of
equitable liability as arising from ‘know-
ing’ (as opposed to ‘dishonest’) assistance
in a breach of trust. In this connection,
although it was not necessary, in his view,
that the defendant should have knowl-
edge of the details of the trust or the
identity of the beneficiaries, it was essen-
tial (at the very least) that they should
have knowledge that they were assisting
in a dishonest scheme. In particular,
knowledge of the various arrangements
by which a person obtained control of
money and participation in a dealing
with money in a manner that was known
to be unauthorised would be enough.
Barlow Clowes
The majority ruling in Twinsectra was fol-
lowed three years later by the Privy
Council decision in Barlow Clowes
International Ltd v Eurotrust International
Ltd & ors [2005]. In this case, the defen-
dants argued that liability for dishonest
assistance required a dishonest state of
mind on the part of the defendant. This,
in turn, involved a subjective mental state
but the standard set by law to measure
that dishonesty was objective. The for-
mulation mirrors the combined test
promulgated by the majority in
Twinsectra and one may be forgiven for
thinking that the defendants’ under-
standing of what constituted dishonesty
in this context was entirely correct in 
law and unimpeachable. However, the
Privy Council disagreed. Lord Hoffmann,
who delivered the judgment of the
Committee, accepted that there was an
‘an element of ambiguity’ in his own
remarks (and those of Lord Hutton) in
Twinsectra that had spurned the mistaken
(academic) belief that dishonesty invited
an enquiry not merely into the defen-
dant’s mental state about the nature of
the transaction in which they were 
participating, but also into their own
views about what constituted acceptable
standards of honesty. Contrary to this
belief, dishonesty did not require the
defendant to have thought about what
those standards were – consciousness of
dishonesty meant simply consciousness
of those elements of the transaction that
made participation transgress ordinary
standards of honest behaviour. On this
point, the Privy Council affirmed the
notion that it was sufficient if the defen-
dant had entertained a ‘clear suspicion’
that the relevant disposals in this case
were of money held on trust. It was not
necessary for the defendants to know all
the details surrounding the misappropri-
ation of investors’ money or, for that
matter, the existence of the trust or the
facts giving rise to the trust. In line with
To suggest that the  Tan and  Twinsectra decisions
can be reconciled simply on the basis of ambiguity is
to understate seriously the divergence in judicial
thought expressed in them.
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the remarks of Lord Millett (and Lord
Hoffmann) in Twinsectra, a person could
know (and clearly suspect) that they
were assisting in a misappropriation of
money without knowing that the money
was held on trust or what a trust actually
meant.
There is no doubt that the Privy
Council decision marked a significant
change in direction (if not an about-face)
from the previous majority ruling in
Twinsectra. Interestingly, two of their
Lordships in Barlow Clowes (Lords Steyn
and Hoffmann) had also represented the
majority in Twinsectra, so the difference 
in approach (tacitly recognising Lord
Millett’s dissent) was even more surpris-
ing. Be that as it may, the two-stage test
endorsed by the Privy Council has been
welcomed by academics and practi-
tioners as avoiding the absurdity of a
defendant successfully escaping liability
by simply arguing that they believed that
their conduct was objectively honest. The
first stage of the Privy Council’s test
requires the court to identify the defen-
dant’s state of mind. Since ‘there is no
window into another mind’, the only
way to achieve this is by drawing 
appropriate inferences from what the
defendant knew, said and did in relation
to the transaction, both at the time it took
place and subsequently. The second stage
requires the court to assess whether the
defendant’s state of mind would be
viewed as dishonest by the ordinary
standards of honest people. If the court so
decides, the defendant is liable for dis-
honest assistance regardless of whether
or not they were aware that their conduct
was dishonest. This straightforward
approach has, therefore, much to recom-
mend it even though, strictly speaking, it
is wholly at odds with the majority rea-
soning in Twinsectra. 
To suggest, however, that the two
decisions can be reconciled simply on the
basis of ambiguity is to understate seri-
ously the divergence in judicial thought
expressed in them. There is no doubt
from the speeches of both Lords
Hoffmann and Hutton in the House of
Lords that the majority in Twinsectra
intended to impose a requirement of con-
scious wrongdoing on the part of the
defendant. It is equally obvious that Lord
Millett’s dissent promulgated a rejection
of this approach, basing the defendant’s
accessory liability on a strictly objective
assessment of their conduct. There is no
doubt, therefore, that the Privy Council
decision marks an effective ‘rowing back’
towards Lord Millett’s minority view.
Latest Court of Appeal ruling
Significantly, the most recent decision of
the Court of Appeal in Adnan Shaaban
Abou-Rahmah v Al-Haji Abdul Kadir
Abacha [2006] has openly recognised this
conflict and has held that the law laid
down in Twinsectra, as interpreted in
Barlow Clowes, represents the current law
of England and Wales. So the defendant’s
dishonesty is to be judged by reference to
an objective standard of honest behav-
iour without any additional requirement
of conscious wrongdoing. The Court of
Appeal has also confirmed that it is not
necessary to show that the person assist-
ing knew of the existence of the relevant
trust (or fiduciary relationship) and/or
that the transfer of funds involved a
breach of trust (or fiduciary duty).
Consistent with the view expressed in
Barlow Clowes, it is enough that the
person assisting had a clear suspicion
that the money was held in trust. So, in
Abou-Rahmah itself, although the bank
manager had a general suspicion that the
defendants might possibly be involved in
money laundering, he did not have 
any particular suspicions about the two
transactions in question. On this basis,
therefore, the trial judge had been correct
to acquit the defendants of dishonesty.
Interestingly, Arden LJ characterised
the Barlow Clowes decision as a clarifica-
tion of the previous law and a recognition
that the requirement of conscious wrong-
doing was a ‘wrong interpretation’ of 
the Twinsectra ruling. Although, accord-
ing to her Ladyship, adherence to strict
precedent was important to create and
maintain legal certainty, it was possible,
in very exceptional circumstances, for 
the Court of Appeal to follow a Privy
Council decision in preference to a previ-
ous ruling of the House of Lords: see, eg,
R v James [2006]. In the instant case, the
Privy Council decision in Barlow Clowes
had expressly clarified English law so
that, following its ruling, an appeal to the
House of Lords would have been a point-
less exercise. For all practical purposes,
therefore, bearing in mind that the mem-
bers of the Privy Council are also usually
members of the Appellate Committee of
the House of Lords, the result of an
appeal would almost certainly have been
a foregone conclusion. Unlike James,
however, her Ladyship did not charac-
terise the Barlow Clowes decision as
necessarily a refusal of, or even a depar-
ture from, the majority in Twinsectra.
Instead, it was to be viewed as providing
‘guidance as to the proper interpretation
to be placed on it’ as a matter of English
law. On this basis, the Tan and Twinsectra
cases could be ‘read together to form a
consistent corpus of law’. 
Conclusion for practitioners 
Despite the foregoing analysis, Arden LJ
also openly recognises that the decision
in Barlow Clowes ‘could probably have
been reached without consideration of
the Twinsectra decision for the purpose 
of English law’. The obvious inference
from this is that the majority ruling has
become largely redundant as a precedent
and may safely now be consigned to the
judicial waste paper bin as having little or
no relevance in determining liability for
knowing assistance. Moreover, the clear
rejection of subjective dishonesty, it is
submitted, now paves the way for a
return to orthodoxy and the acknowledg-
ment of Lord Millett’s synthesis that 
the defendant’s knowledge is the more
appropriate basis for imposing accessory
liability on strangers to the trust. ■
Arden LJ pointed out that it was possible, in very
exceptional circumstances, for the Court of Appeal 
to follow a Privy Council decision in preference to 
a previous ruling of the House of Lords.
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